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I.  Introduction 
In the fall of 1996, and as part of a new approach towards poverty reduction, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund developed a wide-ranging plan to 
provide debt relief to many of the poorest nations in the world.  This program, which has 
come to be known as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, 
contemplates the forgiveness of a fraction of these countries bilateral and multilateral 
debt. An eligibility requirement for participating in the program is that the country in 
question develops a well-defined poverty alleviation program. The funds freed-up by 
debt-relief should be devoted to effective social programs that, in the eyes of the 
multilateral institutions, will contribute to the reduction of poverty.  In addition, the 
country is expected to implement broad economic reforms aimed at strengthening the 
productive sector and increasing growth potential.  By early 2002, 22 poor countries had 
made substantial progress in negotiating debt relief within the context of the HIPC 
initiative. See Table 1 for a list of countries.
1 
The amount of actual debt relief contemplated in the HIPC initiative varies from 
country to country. A basic principle guiding the program is that in the post-HIPC era the 
country in question will be able to achieve “external sector sustainability,” and thus will 
not require new rounds of debt forgiveness.
2  In a recent document, the World Bank and 
the IMF (2001) have stated this principle in the following way: 
 
“[B]y bringing the net present value (NPV) of external debt down to about 150 
percent of a country’s exports or 250 percent of a country’s revenues at the 
decision point, it aims to eliminate this critical barrier to longer term debt 
sustainability for these countries.” (p;. 4; emphasis added). 
 
A particularly important question refers to the type of fiscal policy that will be 
consistent with maintaining debt sustainability in the post HIPC era.  As the above quote 
                                                           
1   In September 1999 the initiative was revised and the elegibility criteria were standardized.  This revised 
program has come to be known as “The Enhanced HIPC Initiative.”   Details on the day-to-day progress in 
the HIPC initiative can be found in the following IMF-maintained web site: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm  2
suggests, the multilaterals have focused on policies required to stabilize the ratio of 
external debt to exports.  A comprehensive answer to the fiscal sustainability question, 
however, requires going beyond the country’s external debt, and to consider the 
sustainability of aggregate public sector debt, including both foreign as well as domestic 
debt.  While many HIPC nations have little domestic debt, others have accumulated a 
significant stock of debt that has been purchased by the local banking sector, pension 
funds and individuals.   Indeed, by ignoring the role of domestic debt, sustainability 
analyses may underestimate the magnitude of the fiscal effort that poor countries will 
have to make in the post-HIPC era.  Very large required fiscal adjustments could have, in 
turn, important political economy consequences.  First, the adjustment may result in a 
reduction of funds available to implement the anti-poverty programs.  And second, very 
large reductions in primary expenditures may result in political instability and reform 
backtracking. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between fiscal policy, 
aggregate public sector debt sustainability, and debt relief.  In particular, I develop a 
methodology to compute the fiscal policy path that is compatible with aggregate debt 
sustainability in the post-HIPC era.  This model explicitly considers the role of domestic 
debt, and quantifies the extent to which future debt sustainability depends on the 
availability of concessional loans at subsidized interest rates.  The working of the model 
is illustrated for the case of Nicaragua, a country that in 2002 had one of the highest net 
public external debt to GDP ratios: approximately 280%.  Nicaragua is the second 
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (after Haiti), and for the last decade has 
relied very heavily on foreign assistance and aid.  The results from this analysis indicate 
that unless Nicaragua receives substantial concessional aid in the future, its public sector 
debt is likely to, once again, become unsustainable.  The reason for this is that in the 
absence of large volumes of concessional assistance Nicaragua would be forced to 
undertake a fiscal adjustment in the order of 6% to 8% of GDP to achieve sustainability.   
Adjustments of this magnitude usually crowd out social expenditures, including poverty 
alleviation programs, and tend to create political economy difficulties.  Although this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2   The World Bank and the IMF (2001) recognize that there is no assurance that these countries will not 
face debt problems in the future.  According to this document, achieving sustainability will require a rapid 
and stable rate of economic growth.  3
result has been obtained for the specific case of Nicaragua, the methodology used is very 
general and underlies two general problems that affect most HIPC countries:  First, 
ignoring the existing domestic debt burden is likely to result in highly misleading 
analyses.  And second, the international community should be aware that sustainability 
would depend very heavily on the future availability of subsidized concessional loans. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II I develop a model of 
debt relief and fiscal sustainability.  In Section III the model is calibrated and simulated 
for the case of Nicaragua. In Section IV I deal with some extensions and I present results 
from a sensitivity analysis.  In Section V I discuss the connection between grants, 
donations and fiscal effort.  Finally, in Section VI I present some concluding remarks. 
II.  Debt Sustainability, Debt Relief and Fiscal Policy in a Poor Country: An 
Analytical Framework 
An economy is said to have achieved fiscal sustainability when the ratio of public 
sector debt to GDP is stationary, and consistent with the overall demand – both domestic 
and foreign –for government securities.
3  An important byproduct of public sector 
sustainability analyses is the computation of the public sector’s primary balance 
compatible with a sustainable and stable debt to GDP ratio.
4  This “sustainable primary 
balance” has become an increasingly important variable in macroeconomic analyses, and 
is now routinely included as a disbursement condition in IMF programs.  The World 
Bank and the IMF have analyzed the external debt sustainability issue using a “present 
value constraint” approach.
5   This approach consists of analyzing whether, once debt 
forgiveness is granted, the net present value of the country’s external debt stabilizes at its 
“steady state” level relative to GDP.
6  In general, it is considered that a ratio of the net 
present value of external debt to GDP of approximately 50% is sustainable over the long 
run.
7  Three main characteristics of the World Bank-IMF approach should be noted:  (1) 
It assumes implicitly that if the country implements an appropriate set of economic 
reforms, the debt-to-GDP ratio achieved immediately after debt relief will be sustainable 
                                                           
3   Naturally, the debt ratio may be calculated relative to an alternative benchmark, such as exports.  On 
sustainability analyses see, for example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996, 2000) and Edwards (2002). 
4   The primary balance is defined as the nominal balance, excluding interest payments. 
5   See, for example, World Bank and IMF (2000), Lachler ( 2001), and World Bank (2002). 
6   See Cuddington, (1995). 
7   In rigor, as pointed out above, the target is to achieve a net present value of debt to exports of 150%.  4
in the longer run.  (2) It assumes (also implicitly) that in the long run the country in 
question will be able to maintain access to concessional financing.  And (3), the “net 
present value” of external debt used in these calculations is lower from the face value of 
the debt.  The reason for this is that poor nations have access to concessional loans at 
subsidized interest rates.
8   
The sustainability model developed in this section expands previous work in 
several directions.  First, and as pointed out above, it goes beyond foreign debt, and 
explicitly considers the role of domestic debt in analyzing fiscal sustainability.  Second, I 
consider the case where the country’s access to subsidized debt declines gradually 
through time.  This is an important assumption, and is based on the notion that after 
reaching a certain GDP per capita, countries tend to rely mostly on debt issued on 
commercial terms.  Third, it assumes that the economy takes some time to reach the 
steady state.  The model, thus, also focuses on the dynamic behavior of the key variables 
during the transition.  And fourth, I explicitly discuss the way in which real exchange rate 
changes – and more specifically real exchange rate devaluations – affect fiscal 
sustainability. 
II.1  The Basic Framework 
I consider two types of public debt:  (A) Concessional (or subsidized) debt 
granted by the multilaterals or other donors, and denoted by DC.  And, (B) debt issued on 
commercial terms, DD.  In what follows I call this debt “domestic debt,” and I assume 
that only local residents hold it.  The analysis, however, can be easily extended to the 
case where both domestic and foreign residents hold this type of debt.   
In the base case I assume that both type of debt are denominated in foreign 
currency (US dollars).
9  At any moment in time total public sector debt is the sum of DC 
and DD; also, at any time t, the net increase in total (dollar denominated) debt is equal to 
the sum of the increase in these two types of debt:  ∆ D t  = ∆ DC t + ∆ DD t.   From the 
                                                           
8   Naturally, using the net present value of debt is equivalent to using the face value and explicitly 
introducing the subsidized interest payments in the future cash flows. 
9 This assumption corresponds quite closely to the case of many of the poorer nations; extending the 
analysis to the case where part of DD is denominated in domestic currency is rather simple. 
Moreover, in order to simplify the presentation in the basic analysis I work with GDP in dollars.  In section 
IV, however, I introduce valuation problems, and consider explicitly the evolution of the real exchange rate 
and its effect on the dollar value of GDP.  5
“uses” side, net debt increases (∆ D t)  are equal to interest payments, plus the primary 
balance (pb), minus seignorage.  More specifically: 
 
(1)  ∆ D t =  { rt
C DC t-1 + rt




D are nominal interest rates on each type of debt. ∆ B t is the change in 
the monetary base; this corresponds to seignorage, and its actual magnitude will depend 
on the rate of domestic inflation, as well as on ratio of the monetary base to nominal 
GDP.  In this equation a positive pb denotes a primary deficit.  In what follows I denote 
nominal GDP (measured in dollars) as Y. 
The main interest of this study is computing the primary balance to GDP ratio that 
is consistent with fiscal “sustainability” in the post-debt forgiveness period.  That is, I am 
interested in the value of (pb / Y) t that, in the post-HIPC era, is consistent with changes 
in aggregate public sector debt that are on a sustainable path.  A sustainable path of 
aggregate public sector debt is defined, in turn, as a situation where increases in each type 
of debt are in line with the pace at which national and international creditors desire to 
accumulate government-issued securities. Without loss of generality I assume that in the 
post-HIPC period the donor community is willing to increase its accumulation of this 
country’s concessional debt at an annual rate of θ.
10  Likewise, I assume that holders of 
domestic debt are willing to accumulate it at a rate equal to β.  In the long run, an 
important constraint is that neither the concessional nor the domestic debt-to-GDP ratios 
grow without limit.  In other words, in the long run these ratios should be bounded. 
Denoting the real rate of GDP growth by g, and the rate of dollar inflation by π *, these 
constraints may be written as:
11 
 
(2)  θ ≤ ( g + π *) ;  β ≤ ( g + π *) . 
 
                                                           
10   It is easy to generalize the analysis – as we do later – to the case were θ changes through time. 
11  Since we are assuming that all debt is dollar-denominated, we can write the rate of growth of dollar 
denominated GDP as the sum of the rate of real GDP growth, plus the rate of US inflation.  If domestic 
currency denominated debt is allowed, we would have to make a correction related to debt valuation issues.   6
These conditions are required to assure convergence of the primary balance ratio (pb / Y) 
through time – see equation (3), below, for details.  With regard to seignorage, in the base 
case I assume that the domestic rate of inflation is π, and that the income elasticity of 
demand for money is unity.  Alternative assumptions regarding the income elasticity of 
the demand for money can be easily incorporated into the analysis (see Section IV).  
From equation (1), and using the sustainable rates of growth of both types of debt 
(θ and β ), a very general expression for the dynamic behavior of the sustainable primary 
balance to GDP ratio may be obtained.  This is the primary balance to GDP ratio that, at 
any period of time t, is consistent with the aggregate debt to GDP ratio being on a 
sustainable path (a positive number denotes a primary deficit):
12  
 
(3) (  pb  t / Y t ) = [ { θ - rt
C } ( DC 0 / D 0 ) e 
( θ - g - π * ) ( t –1)     +  
{ β - rt
D } ( DD 0 / D 0 ) e 
( β - g - π * ) (t –1) ] [1 / ( 1 + g + π *) ] – 
(g + π ) ( B 0 / Y 0 ). 
 
Where ( DC 0 / Y 0 ) is the initial ratio of the face value of concessional debt to GDP.
13  
Likewise, ( DD 0 / Y 0 ) is the initial domestic debt to GDP ratio. π is the (target) rate of 
domestic inflation and ( B 0 / Y 0 ) is the initial ratio of base money to GDP.
14  In 
equation (3) the initial debt to GDP ratios ( DC 0 / Y 0 ) and ( DD 0 / Y 0 ) should be 
interpreted as the ratios prevailing immediately after the HIPC-sponsored debt reduction 
has been granted.   
Equation (3) shows that the dynamic path for the sustainable primary balance 
depends on a number of key variables, including nominal interest rates on both types of 
debt, the rates of domestic and foreign inflation, the rate of growth of real GDP, and the 
sustainable rates of growth of both types of debt (θ and β).  In the rest of this section I 
                                                                                                                                                                             
This “correction term,” however, would only be relevant if there are changes in the real exchange rate.  See 
the discussion below for greater details. 
12 Notice that in order to make this equation more operational we have expressed most of the relevant 
variables as a percentage of nominal GDP. 
13  Notice that this model focuses on the “face value of debt.”  Naturally, a perfectly equivalent expression 
can be derived on the basis of the present value of debt.  The approach followed here is, however, more 
transparent as it provides a clear description of the flows involved.  7
investigate the way in which the availability of concessional financing and the rate of 
growth of GDP affect the sustainable primary balance.
15   
II.2  Concessional Debt and Sustainable Fiscal Policy 
In order to organize the discussion, I consider four possible cases for the evolution 
of concessional loans through time.  These cases go from a rather conservative scenario, 
where concessional loans are rolled over every year with no additional funds being 
available, to an optimistic one where concessional loans are assumed to grow at the same 
rate as nominal GDP.  More specifically: 
•  Case A:  It is assumed that maturing consessional loans are fully rolled 
over.  That is, the nominal value of concessional debt is maintained 
constant through time, and no net funds (in nominal dollars) are provided.  
In terms of the model, this means that θ = 0. 
•  Case B:  Under this scenario I assume that the donor community is willing 
to maintain the real dollar value of the concessional debt at the level it had 
immediately after debt reduction is granted.  In this case, θ = π *, and 
concessional debt grows at the international rate of inflation.  To the 
extent that the rate of growth of real GDP (g) is positive, the concessional 
debt to GDP ratio will gradually converge towards zero. 
•  Case C:  It is assumed that the international community is willing to 
increase concessional funds in real terms.  More specifically, in this case I 
assume that θ = ( φ g + π * ), where 0 ≤  φ <  1.  (Notice that I have ruled 
out the case where φ = 1.  That case corresponds to scenario D). 
•  Case D:  This is the most optimistic of all four scenarios, and assumes that 
the donor community is willing to provide sufficient concessional funds as 
to maintain the concessional debt to GDP ratio at the immediate post 
HIPC level.  This is, in this case θ = ( g + π *) .  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14   It should be noted that the results obtained from this model refer to the fiscal effort under the 
assumption that the country achieves a certain target rate of growth and a certain target rate of domestic 
inflation.  In that sense these are conditional results are not the outcome of a general equilibrium exercise.  8
Existing studies on the HIPC initiative have mostly concentrated on Case D, and have 
assumed that after the HIPC initiative the country will continue to have access to 
substantial amounts of concessional financing.  As pointed out above, however, this 
appears to be an optimistic assumption that will tend to underestimate the type of fiscal 
effort required to maintain fiscal sustainability.  In that sense, the approach followed in 
this paper is more general and provides insights on the relationship between donors’ 
behavior and the type of fiscal policy effort required to achieve sustainability. 
In order to concentrate on the effects of concessional funds availability, in the rest 
of this section I assume that domestic debt ( DD ) grows at a rate equal to that of nominal 
GDP.  This means that β = ( g + π *), and that the ratio of DD to GDP will remain 
constant and equal to its period 0 level.  In Section IV, however, I explore the way in 
which the results change if this assumption is altered.  
Table 2 summarizes the basic results for the primary balance and debt ratios under 
the four alternative scenarios defined above.  While the rows refer to the four scenarios, 
the columns provide the key results from this analysis.  In column (a) I present the 
equations for the dynamic behavior of the sustainable primary balance.  Column (b) 
contains the equations for the steady state sustainable primary balance.  In column (c) I 
present the stationary concessional debt to GDP ratio ( DC / Y ).  Finally, in column (d) I 
present the stationary domestic debt to GDP ratio ( DD / Y ).   The equations in Columns 
(b) – (d) correspond, then, to the case when t → ∞. A number of insights emerge from 
this table: 
•  In the first three cases (A through C) the steady-state ratio of concessional 
debt to GDP – which is reported in Column (c) -- is equal to zero.  The 
three cases differ, however, on the speed at which this steady state is 
achieved.  However, even in Case A – which is the “most conservative” 
scenario – the speed at which the concessional debt ratio is reduced is very 
gradual (see the simulations in Section III). 
•  In Case D, the steady state concessional debt to GDP ratio is equal to its 
value in the initial period.  The reason for this is that under this scenario 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15   See the discussion in IMF and IDA “Nicaragua: Decision Point Document for the HIPC Initiative,” 
December 7, 2000, on possible donors’ behavior in the post HIPC period.  We return to this issue in the  9
the sustainable debt to GDP ratio is equal to the one prevailing 
immediately after the debt is forgiven.  This is also the reason why in Case 
D the dynamic and steady equations for the sustainable primary balance 
are the same. 
•  In all four cases the steady state ratio of domestic debt to GDP is equal to 
the period 0 level.  This is the result of assuming that β = ( g + π *).  In 
Section IV, however, this assumption is relaxed and the case where ( 
DD/Y) changes through time is investigated. 
•  Cases A, B and C have the same steady state sustainable primary balance.  
The reason for this is that in all three cases the steady state level of 
concessional debt is equal to zero.  The equation for this steady-state 
sustainable primary balance is equivalent to the one obtained in debt 
dynamic models for middle-income countries, or countries that have no 
access to subsidized debt.  Notice that the steady state primary balance can 
correspond either to a deficit or to a surplus.  If the rate of growth of 
nominal GDP in dollars is low, relative to the interest rate on domestic 
debt, it is likely that the country will need to run a primary surplus in the 
long run.  Whether or not this is actually the case, will depend on the 
importance of seignorage.   
•  Under Case D the country’s fiscal effort is lower than under any of the 
other three cases.  The reason for this is that under Case D the country has 
continuous access to subsidized financing. 
•  The long run sustainable primary balance under Case D may be either a 
deficit or a surplus.  If the weighted average of interest rates is higher than 
the nominal rate of GDP growth, the country is indeed likely to be 
required to run a primary surplus in the long run.  Again, the magnitude of 
seignorage will determine whether this is, indeed, the case. 
•  The equations in Column (b) show that the existence of domestic debt has 
an important effect on the long run primary balance.  Indeed, from these 
equations it is clear that ignoring domestic debt may result in a substantial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
next subsection where we present our computations for Nicaragua.   10
underestimation of the fiscal effort required to maintain fiscal 
sustainability.  Under a set of plausible parameter values, this fiscal effort 
may be underestimated by as much as 3 percentage points of GDP per 
year.  This point becomes particularly clear in the simulations presented in 
Section III, below. 
 
III.  Debt Sustainability Under Alternative Donor Behavior:  A Case Study 
In this section I illustrate the working of the model using data for Nicaragua, one 
of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, and one that for decades has been 
burdened by an extremely high external debt.  In 2000 Nicaragua’s total external debt had 
reached a face value of $6.8 billion, representing 280% of the country’s official GDP.
16  
The World Bank and IMF (2000) have calculated that in terms of net present value this 
debt represented $4.5 billion, or approximately 180% of GDP.
17  The enhanced HIPC 
initiative contemplates reducing Nicaragua’s external debt burden to a net present value 
of approximately US$ 1.32 billion or 150% of exports.  This, in turn, amounts to 55% of 
official GDP.  After forgiveness is granted, the face value of Nicaragua’s external debt is 
expected to be approximately US$ 4.2 billion, or 167% of official GDP.
18   
In addition to its very high external debt, Nicaragua has other characteristics that 
make it an ideal candidate for a case study.  First, it also has a very high domestic debt 
burden – in excess of 50% of GDP in 2002.  This ratio is several times higher than that of 
other HIPC nations.  As Table A.1 in the Appendix shows, the average domestic debt to 
GDP ratio in a group of HIPC countries is only 16.5%.  Second, an as shown in Table 3, 
during the last few years Nicaragua has run very large fiscal deficits, with the primary 
deficit to GDP ratio averaging almost 5% during 1999-2001.  This deficit level is much 
larger than those of other Latin American nations.  In fact, most countries in the region 
                                                           
16   There is general agreement that Nicaragua’s official GDP underestimates “real” GDP.  There is less 
agreement, however, on the magnitude of this underestimation.  While according to the World Bank (2002) 
“adjusted” GDP is approximately 1.7 times the official figure, other experts have argued that the 
adjustment should be closer to 1.3 times.  For the sake of consistency, in the rest of the paper I use official 
GDP data.  The results, however, would not be affected significantly if adjusted data are used.  I briefly 
deal with this issue in the concluding remarks section.  
17   This figure assumes that Nicaragua has used all “traditional” debt relief mechanisms available to it 
under the so-called “Naples terms.”  See World Bank and IMF (2000), Tables 3 and 4. 
18  See World Bank and IMF (2000) for details.  It is expected that debt relief under this initiative will be 
granted in mid-2003.  11
run a primary surplus.  Third, Nicaragua relies very heavily on grants and donations by 
NGOs to finance its public sector expenditures – see Section V for a discussion.  And 
fourth, remittances from migrants represent a very important source of current account 
financing.
19   A useful exercise is to compare the sustainable primary balance that 
emerges from the model’s simulation with the actual balances during the last few years.  
This comparison will provide some guidelines on of the type of fiscal adjustment – if any 
– that Nicaragua will have to undertake after the HIPC-sponsored debt relief is granted. 
III.1 Parameterization of the Model  
In this sub-section I briefly present the parameter values used in the sustainability 
exercise for Nicaragua (See Table 4 for a summary).   
Post-HIPC Concessionary Debt to GDP Ratio, ( DC 0 / Y 0 ):, The HIPC initiative 
considers reducing the face value of the external debt to approximately US$ 4.2 billion, 
or 167% of GDP. Thus, the value of ( DC 0 / Y 0 ) used in the baseline computations is, 
then, equal to 1.67.   
Post-HIPC Domestic Debt to GDP Ratio, ( DD 0 / Y 0 ): Both the Treasury and the 
Central Bank of Nicaragua have issued large volumes of domestic debt.  This stock of 
domestic debt – which in late 2001 reached 52.5% of GDP – has different origins, 
including bonds issued by the treasury to compensate individuals whose property was 
expropriated during the Sandinista rule, and bonds issued by the Central Bank to support 
commercial banks that failed during the late 1990s and early 2000s – see Edwards and 
Vergara (2001), World Bank (2002), and Lachler (2001) fore details.  In the base-line 
computations I use a value of ( DD 0 / Y 0 ) equal to 0.525.  It is important to notice that 
this domestic debt ratio (at 52.5% of GDP) is high from a comparative perspective.  This 
is so, quite independently of the fact that Nicaragua already has a very large concessional 
debt burden, and that Nicaragua’s official GDP is likely to be significantly 
underestimated.  Even if, as was argued earlier, “true” GDP is 1.3 to 1.7 times “official” 
GDP, the domestic debt burden is still high.  
                                                           
19  On the behavior of the current account in Nicaragua see, for example, IMF (2001), Edwards and Vergara 
(2001) and Edwards (2002).  12
  Rate of Future Accumulation of Debt, θ and β: I use the values corresponding to 
scenarios A-D discussed above.  For Scenario C, I assume that φ = ½, and, thus, that θ = 
((g/2) + π * ).  See Table 4 for details.   
  Rate of Growth of Nominal GDP (in US$): The World Bank and the IMF (2000) 
have assumed that Nicaragua’s real GDP will grow at 5.5% in real terms in the period 
2002-2008 and at 5% into the longer run.  In this study, however, and in order to 
investigate the role of growth on sustainability, I consider alternative values of real GDP 
growth, ranging from 2% to 7% per year. With respect to US inflation I assume 2.5% per 
year during the period under study. 
  Interest Rates: I assume a baseline value of the concessional rate of interest of 3% 
in nominal terms.  This is the result of considering an interest rate of 0.75% on 
multilateral debt, and an interest rate on bilateral rate debt of 4.75% in nominal terms.
20 
With respect to the commercial rate of domestic debt, I assume in the base case scenario 
that the government can borrow, on average, at 15% in nominal US dollar terms.  
Although this number may appear to be on the high side, it is not.  In fact, this interest 
rate is in line, in terms of the implicit country risk premium, with rates in some Latin 
American nations such as Brazil and Venezuela that have access to international financial 
markets. Also, it is slightly lower than the average interest rate paid by Central Bank of 
Nicaragua during the recent past.
21  In Section IV I consider, however, alternative values 
for the cost of domestic debt. 
Domestic rate of inflation: In the baseline sustainability exercise I assume that 
Nicaragua maintains an inflationary target of 8.5 % per annum.  This rate of inflation, in 
turn, is assumed to be the result of a combined international inflation of 2.5% and a rate 
of devaluation of the crawling peg Córdoba of the 6% per year.  I do consider, however, 
alternative inflationary targets in the sensitivity analysis reported in Section IV. 
III.2  Nicaragua’s Sustainable Fiscal Policy Path: Basic Results 
Table 5 contains the results from computing the sustainable primary balance, under 
the four scenarios described above.  In this Table a positive number refers to a primary 
deficit, and year 1 should be interpreted as the first year after debt forgiveness has been 
                                                           
20 See Edwards and Vergara (2001) and World Bank and IMF (2000). 
21 See Banco Central de Nicaragua, “Informe Sobre la Deuda Interna” Various Issues.  13
granted.
22  That is, the smaller the number in this table (i.e. the more negative it is) the 
larger the fiscal effort Nicaragua required to achieve sustainability.  The most salient 
results from this table are:  
•  Depending on the scenario and of the assumed rate of growth of GDP, the 
sustainable balance may be either a deficit (a positive number in Table 5), or a 
surplus (a negative number in Table 5).   
•  The sustainable primary balance is highly sensitive to the rate of real GDP 
growth.  The higher the rate of growth, the smaller the fiscal effort that the 
country has to make.  Consider, for instance, Scenario C: for a real rate of growth 
of GDP of 4% per year, the country has to run a sustainable primary surplus of 
0.7% of GDP during the first year. Then, this surplus has to increase gradually, 
reaching 1.1% of GDP in year 10, and stabilizing at 3.1% of GDP in the steady 
state. If the rate of growth goes up to 5%, then the country would be able to run a 
primary deficit of 0.66% of GDP during the first year.  On the other hand, a lower 
rate of growth of GDP will result in a lower sustainable deficit.  At a 3% annual 
real GDP growth, a surplus of 2.1% of GDP is needed in year one.   
•  Only under two scenarios (C and D), and for rates of growth of real GDP in 
excess of 5% and 3% respectively, is the sustainable primary balance path 
characterized, every year, by a primary deficit.   
•  Under Scenarios A and B, which are the more conservative ones in terms of the 
future availability of subsidized loans a primary surplus is required for all rates of 
growth considered in this analysis. This would imply a major adjustment relative 
to the current situation. This result is particularly important, since it illustrates the 
extent to which Nicaragua’s future fiscal efforts are sensitive to future evolutions 
of concessional assistance. 
•  Even under Scenario C – which is characterized by real increases in concessional 
aid through time –a primary surplus is required every year, if the rate of growth of 
real GDP is lower than 5% of GDP  
                                                           
22   Thus, if debt relief is granted – as expected, in mid-2003, year 1 in Table 5 should be interpreted as 
referring to year 2004.  14
•  It is possible, for instance, that by overestimating the future availability of “soft 
loans,” analysts will underestimate the extent of fiscal adjustment required in the 
years to come.  I return to this issue below. 
 
Table 6 contains the evolution of the concessional debt to GDP ratio under the four basic 
scenarios. As before, the computations have been made for a number of alternative future 
rates of growth of real GDP.  The rate at which this ratio declines in Scenarios A through 
C depends on the assumed rate of growth of GDP.  In every one of th se three scenarios, 
the rate of decline of the concessional debt to GDP ratio is gradual.  For instance, under 
Scenario C, if GDP grows at an annual rate of 5% per year, after ten years the ratio of 
concessional debt to GDP is still over 100% of GDP.
23 In scenario D, which assumes the 
greatest availability of subsidized loans in the future, this ratio remains constant at 167%. 
Which of these four scenarios is more “realistic”?  The World Bank and IMF 
(2000) have projected that Nicaragua will receive an average disbursement of net 
concessional loans in the neighborhood of US$ 200 million per year during the first five 
years of the post HIPC era. This projection is similar to the figures obtained from 
Scenario C, which assumes that in the post HIPC period concessional loans grow at a rate 
of θ = ((g /2) + π *). In that sense, then, Scenario C may be considered as the most 
“realistic” of the four.  For this reason, in Sections IV and V, on extensions and the role 
of grants and donations, I center on this scenario – results for the other scenarios are 
available on request.  Notice that the actual average primary deficit for 1999-2001 (Table 
3) exceeds every single entry in Panel C of Table 5. 
IV.    Extensions  
In this section I extend the model in several directions, and I investigate the way 
in which changing some of the key assumptions affect the basic results presented in 
Tables 5 and 6.  In particular, I deal with the following extensions:  (1) The case where 
the real exchange rate is initially overvalued by 10%, relative to its long run equilibrium 
value.  (2) A different (higher) rate of domestic inflation.  (3) The case where the initial 
ratio of domestic debt to GDP is not the same as the steady state equilibrium ratio. And 
                                                           
23   By construction in all three scenarios the domestic debt to GDP ratio remains constant at 0.525.  We 
consider alternative cases in our sensitivity analysis below.  15
(4) I investigate how a lower cost of domestic debt is likely to affect fiscal sustainability.  
In order to maintain the discussion focused, I report the results from these four extensions 
for the case where θ = ((g/2) + π *), or Scenario C.  The results corresponding to the 
other scenarios are available on request. 
IV.1  Real Exchange Rate Changes  
The sustainability exercises presented above assume that the real exchange rate 
remains stable at its initial level in the indefinite future.  Naturally, this needs not be the 
case.  Indeed, it is possible that initially the RER is overvalued with respect to its 
equilibrium value.  This situation would affect the calculations of the primary balance 
sustainable path.  More specifically, in this case the equation for the sustainable primary 
balance in period t becomes: 
 
(4) (  pb  t / Y t ) = [ { g/2 + π *  - rt
C } ( DC 0 / Y 0 ) e 
 {(d rer / rer) – (g/2) } ( t  - 1)    +  
          { g  + π * - rt
D } ( DD 0 / Y 0 ) ) e 
 (d rer / rer)  ( t  - 1)    ] [1 / ( 1 + g + π *) ] 
            -  (g + π ) ( B 0 / Y 0 ).  
 
Where  (d rer /rer) t is the change in the real exchange rate in period t. The RER, in turn, 
is assumed to evolve through time according to the following equation: 
 
(5)   rer  t  =  rer* + (rer * - rer 0 ) e 
- γ t . 
 
Here, rer * is the equilibrium real exchange rate, and γ is the rate at which RER 
disequilibria are eliminated through time.   
  Panel A in Table 7 contains the results for the sustainable path primary balance in 
Nicaragua under the assumption that the real exchange rate is originally 10% overvalued.  
All other assumptions used to make the computations in this Table correspond to those of 
Scenario C.  As may be seen from these figures, the sustainable path is characterized by a 
somewhat tighter fiscal policy. 
IV.2  Domestic Inflation 
The results presented in the preceding section assume that the rate of domestic 
inflation is equal to 8.5% per year.  From a policy point of view, an important question is  16
whether the country’s fiscal effort would have to be different under alternative rates of 
domestic inflation.  In fact, politicians are usually tempted to argue that at higher rates of 
inflation, the country will have to make a smaller fiscal effort.  This, however, is not the 
case.  Indeed, there is ample evidence suggesting that under most conditions the 
seignoriage-maximizing rate of inflation is rather low – of the order of 5% per annum.  
This means that increases in the rate of inflation above what is considered in this paper 
are likely to reduce revenues from seignorage.  This means that higher inflation would 
imply a greater fiscal effort for Nicaragua.
24  Panel B in table 7 contains the simulation 
results under the assumption that the domestic rate of inflation increases to 12% per year.  
As may be seen, the results indicate that the required fiscal effort increases somewhat. 
IV.3  Changes in the Long Run Domestic Debt Ratio  
The simulation exercises reported in section III assumed that:  (1)The ratio 
concessional debt to GDP declines through time.  And (2), the ratio of domestic 
(commercial) rate to GDP remains constant at its initial level (in the actual simulations, 
this ratio is assumed to remain at 0.525).  There is no reason for the latter to be the case, 
however.  Indeed, it is perfectly possible for the demand for domestic debt (relative to the 
country’s GDP) to change through time.  Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that 
as the concessional debt to GDP ratio declines, domestic debt will increase until it 
reaches a new equilibrium. In the case of Nicaragua, however, at 52.5% of GDP, 
domestic public sector debt is already high by international standards.
25  This suggests, 
then, that if anything, it is possible that in the future Nicaragua’s sustainable domestic 
debt to GDP will be lower.  For this reason, and in order to consider a more conservative 
perspective, I calculated the sustainable primary balance path under the assumption that 
the domestic debt to GDP ratio declines gradually from its current 0.525 level to 0.45, a 
level that is still quite high from a Latin American comparative perspective.  The results 
for the dynamic sustainable path are reported in Panel C of Table 7.
26  As may be seen, 
the magnitude of the fiscal effort experiences some important changes relative to the 
                                                           
24   I performed a number of exercises assuming alternative rates of inflation.  They did confirm the point 
made above.  Notice, however, that an unexpected increase in the rate of inflation may result in short run 
increases in seignorage.  This situation would be short lived, however, and in the medium to longer run the 
country will be worse-off. 
25   See for example the data on domestic debt to GDP ratios for the Latin American nations in Table 8 of 
Goldman Sachs (2002).  17
results reported in Table 5.   For instance, if growth is assumed to be 5% of GDP, the 
sustainable fiscal deficit in 2002 declines to 0.26% of GDP; in the steady state the 
country would have to run a primary surplus of little under 2% of GDP.
27  
IV.4  The Cost of Domestic Debt 
  In Panel D of Table 7 I present the sustainable path for the primary balance under 
the assumption that the (nominal) cost of domestic debt is 12%.  The results obtained 
indicate that, as expected, the fiscal effort in the post-HIPC era is quite sensitive to the 
cost of capital.  The lower the cost of domestic debt, the lower the fiscal effort required in 
the post-HIPC period. 
V.  Grants, Donations and Fiscal Adjustment After HIPC  
  The exercises presented above provide estimations for alternative sustainable 
paths for the primary balance, after the government has received grants, transfers and 
“donations.”  However, in most HIPC countries, including in Nicaragua, future fiscal 
efforts are also be affected by the evolution of transfers and grants provided by the 
advanced nations’ and the NGOs.  If these grants and transfers decline as a percentage of 
GDP, the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment has to be larger than otherwise.  At any 
moment in time the public sector budget constraint is given by: 
 
(6)           pe + r D – t – G - ∆ B = ∆ D, 
 
where pe is primary expenditure, r D refers to interest payments on all the public sector 
debt, t are taxes, G are grants and donations, ∆ B is seignorage, and ∆ D refers to net 
increases of aggregate public sector debt.  Using the definition of primary balance (pb), 
this expression may be rewritten as follows: 
 
(7)      pe – t = pb + G. 
 
The left hand side of equation (7) includes two policy variables – primary expenditure 
and taxes.  The two terms in the left hand side, on the other hand, are pre-determined.  pb 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26   The actual equations used in these simulations are available on request.  18
is the primary balance required to achieve sustainability, and is given by the analysis 
presented in the preceding sections, and G are grants and donations from the international 
donor community.   
The World Bank and IMF (2000) have estimated that grants and transfers to the 
HIPC countries will decline in the post debt forgiveness era.  In the case of Nicaragua are 
expected to decline from approximately 10% of GDP in 2000, to approximately 4% of 
GDP in the year 2007.  According to these estimates, this decline will be significant 
beginning in the year 2004, and by 2005 grants and transfers will be 5% of GDP lower 
than in the year 2001.  These projections further suggest that for most poor countries, life 
after HIPC will not be easy. 
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
A fundamental goal of the debt relief HIPC initiative is to help poor countries 
move towards macroeconomic sustainability.  The World Bank and the IMF have argued 
that this will not be automatic, and will require implementing reforms that will help 
accelerate growth.  The model developed in this paper shows that whether a country 
indeed achieves sustainability is likely to depend on three additional set of variables:  (1)  
The initial stock of domestic debt.  (2) The availability of concessional loans going 
forward.  And (3), the future path of grants and donations.  The application of the model 
to the case of Nicaragua illustrates the challenges of the post HIP period.  Under a 
reasonable set of assumptions regarding future GDP growth, concessional loans and 
donations, the required fiscal adjustment appears to be severe.  Whether this adjustment 
will affect the country’s ability to implement an effective poverty reduction program is 
still to be seen. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27   We also computed the path under the assumption that the domestic debt to GDP ratio increases to 0.60.  
Naturally, in this case the fiscal effort is somewhat – and only somewhat -- reduced  19
TABLE 1:  HIPC Initiative: 22 HIPCs 
having reached their Decision Points* 
 
COUNTRY        GDP Per Capita 
(US$) 
 
Benin             380 
Bolivia       1010 
Burkina Faso           240 
Cameroon           580 
Gambia, The           340 
Guinea            510 
Guinea-Bissau           160 
Guyana            760 
Honduras          760 
Madagascar          250 
Malawi           190 
Mali              240 
Mauritania           380 
Mozambique           230 
Nicaragua           430 
Niger             190 
Rwanda           250 
Sao Tome & Principe         270 
Senegal            510 
Tanzania           240 
Uganda           320 
Zambia           320 
 
Simple  average        389 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 3:  Consolidated Public Sector Balance in Nicaragua: 1995-2001 















































































































































*  In 1999 Hurricane Mitch resulted in a major emergency, and generated an increase in foreign 
assistance. 














Comments and Sources 
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Some scenarios assume 
that even in the steady state 
Nicaragua has a 
considerable debt to GDP 
ratio;  other assume that in 
the very long run 




Rate of accumulation of 





( g + π *) 
 
Assumes that initial ratio is 
maintained. 
 
Rate of growth of nominal 
GDP in US dollars 
 
 
( g + π*)  
 
We assume several 
alternative values for real 
growth (g), ranging from 
2% to 7%; we assume a 
rate of US inflation of 
2.5% per year. 
 
 
The sustainable path of the 
primary balance will 
critically depend on the 
growth assumptions. 
 









Taken from projections 
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TABLE 5:  Nicaragua’s Sustainable Primary Balance Path 
Under Alternative Scenarios* 
 
 
  SCENARIO A 
  RATE OF REAL GDP GROWTH 
Year 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -9.17 -8.49 -7.81 -7.15 -6.50 -5.86 
2  -8.96 -8.23 -7.52 -6.82 -6.13 -5.45 
3  -8.76 -7.99 -7.24 -6.50 -5.78 -5.07 
4  -8.56 -7.76 -6.98 -6.21 -5.46 -4.73 
5  -8.38 -7.55 -6.74 -5.95 -5.17 -4.42 
6  -8.20 -7.34 -6.51 -5.70 -4.90 -4.13 
7  -8.03 -7.15 -6.30 -5.46 -4.66 -3.87 
8  -7.87 -6.97 -6.09 -5.25 -4.43 -3.64 
9  -7.72 -6.80 -5.91 -5.05 -4.22 -3.43 
10  -7.69 -6.71 -5.74 -4.64 -3.90 -3.31 
St. State  -4.38 -3.74 -3.11 -2.49 -1.89 -1.29 
 
 
  SCENARIO B 
  RATE OF REAL GDP GROWTH 
Year 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -5.17 -4.53 -3.89 -3.27 -2.65 -2.05 
2  -5.16 -4.51 -3.86 -3.23 -2.61 -2.00 
3  -5.14 -4.48 -3.83 -3.20 -2.57 -1.95 
4  -5.13 -4.46 -3.81 -3.16 -2.53 -1.91 
5  -5.11 -4.44 -3.78 -3.13 -2.49 -1.86 
6  -5.10 -4.42 -3.75 -3.10 -2.46 -1.82 
7  -5.08 -4.40 -3.73 -3.07 -2.42 -1.79 
8  -5.07 -4.38 -3.70 -3.04 -2.39 -1.75 
9  -5.06 -4.36 -3.68 -3.01 -2.36 -1.72 
10  -4.92 -4.21 -3.42 -2.84 -2.19 -1.65 
St. State  -4.38 -3.74 -3.11 -2.49 -1.89 -1.29 




Table 5 (Continuation) 
 
 
  SCENARIO C 
  RATE OF REAL GDP GROWTH 
Year  2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -3.53 -2.11 -0.71 0.66  2.01  3.33 
2  -3.54 -2.13 -0.76 0.58  1.89  3.18 
3  -3.55 -2.16 -0.81 0.51  1.78  3.02 
4  -3.55 -2.18 -0.85 0.43  1.68  2.88 
5  -3.56 -2.20 -0.89 0.36  1.57  2.74 
6  -3.57 -2.22 -0.94 0.29  1.47  2.60 
7  -3.58 -2.25 -0.98 0.23  1.37  2.47 
8  -3.59 -2.27 -1.02 0.16  1.28  2.34 
9  -3.59 -2.29 -1.06 0.10  1.19  2.22 
10  -3.69 -2.42 -1.11 0.00  1.01  2.02 
St. State  -4.33 -3.69 -3.07 -2.45 -1.84 -1.24 
 
 
  SCENARIO D 
  RATE OF REAL GDP GROWTH 
Year  2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
2  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
3  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
4  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
5  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
6  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
7  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
8  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
9  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
10  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
St. State  -1.93 0.26 2.42 4.54 6.63 8.67 
        
 
*  A positive number means that the country is able to run a primary deficit. For details on the 
computations, see the discussion in the text and the equations in Table 2.  25
 
TABLE 6:  Evolution of Nicaragua’s Concessional Debt to GDP Ratio 
Under Alternative Scenarios* 
 
 
  SCENARIO A 
 GROWTH 
Year 2.00%  3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
2 159.65  158.06 156.49 154.93 153.39 151.87 
3 152.63  149.60 146.64 143.74 140.89 138.10 
4 145.91  141.60 137.41 133.35 129.41 125.59 
5 139.49  134.02 128.77 123.72 118.87 114.20 
6 133.35  126.85 120.66 114.78 109.18 103.85 
7 127.48  120.06 113.07 106.48 100.28  94.44 
8 121.87 113.64  105.95  98.79 92.11 85.88 
9 116.51 107.55  99.28 91.65 84.61 78.10 
10 111.39 101.80  93.04 85.03 77.71 71.02 
St. State 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
  SCENARIO B 
 GROWTH 
Year 2.00%  3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
2 163.69  162.06 160.45 158.86 157.27 155.71 
3 160.45  157.27 154.16 151.11 148.12 145.18 
4 157.27  152.63 148.12 143.74 139.49 135.37 
5 154.16  148.12 142.31 136.73 131.37 126.22 
6 151.11  143.74 136.73 130.06 123.72 117.68 
7 148.12  139.49 131.37 123.72 116.51 109.73 
8 145.18  135.37 126.22 117.68 109.73 102.31 
9 142.31  131.37 121.27 111.94 103.34  95.39 
10 139.49  127.48 116.51 106.48  97.32  88.94 
St. State 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  26
TABLE 6 (Continuation): 
 
  SCENARIO C 
 GROWTH 
Year 2.00%  3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
2 165.34  164.51 163.69 162.88 162.06 161.26 
3 163.69  162.06 160.45 158.86 157.27 155.71 
4 162.06  159.65 157.27 154.93 152.63 150.35 
5 160.45  157.27 154.16 151.11 148.12 145.18 
6 158.86  154.93 151.11 147.38 143.74 140.19 
7 157.27  152.63 148.12 143.74 139.49 135.37 
8 155.71  150.35 145.18 140.19 135.37 130.71 
9 154.16  148.12 142.31 136.73 131.37 126.22 
10 152.63  145.91 139.49 133.35 127.48 121.87 
St. State 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
  SCENARIO D 
 GROWTH 
Year 2.00%  3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
2 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
3 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
4 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
5 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
6 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
7 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
8 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
9 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
10 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
St. State 167.00  167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 167.00 
 
*:  In these computations I have used Nicaragua’s official GDP figures.  For details on the 
computations see the text and the equations in Table 2.  27
TABLE 7:  Extensions and Sensitivity Analysis: 




  A:  REAL EXCHANGE RATE 10% OVERVALUED 
 GROWTH 
Year 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -3.66 -2.20 -0.76 0.64  2.03  3.39 
2  -3.69 -2.24 -0.82 0.56  1.91  3.24 
3  -3.69 -2.26 -0.86 0.49  1.80  3.07 
4  -3.67 -2.26 -0.90 0.42  1.69  2.91 
5  -3.65 -2.26 -0.93 0.35  1.58  2.76 
6  -3.63 -2.27 -0.96 0.28  1.47  2.62 
7  -3.62 -2.28 -1.00 0.22  1.37  2.48 
8  -3.62 -2.29 -1.03 0.15  1.28  2.35 
9  -3.61 -2.30 -1.07 0.09  1.19  2.22 




  B:  12% INFLATION RATE 
 GROWTH 
Year  2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -3.64 -2.24 -0.88 0.46  1.78  3.08 
2  -3.64 -2.27 -0.92 0.39  1.67  2.92 
3  -3.65 -2.29 -0.97 0.31  1.56  2.77 
4  -3.66 -2.31 -1.02 0.24  1.45  2.62 
5  -3.67 -2.34 -1.06 0.17  1.35  2.48 
6  -3.68 -2.36 -1.10 0.10  1.25  2.34 
7  -3.68 -2.38 -1.14 0.03  1.15  2.21 
8  -3.69 -2.40 -1.19 -0.03 1.05  2.08 
9  -3.70 -2.42 -1.23 -0.10 0.96  1.96 
St.  State -4.44 -3.83 -3.23 -2.64 -2.07 -1.50 
  28
 
(TABLE 7: Continuation) 
 
  C:  DECLINE OF DOMESTIC DEBT FROM 52.5% TO 45% 
 GROWTH 
Year  2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
1  -3.91  -2.48  -1.08 0.29 1.64 2.97 
2  -3.86  -2.45  -1.08 0.26 1.57 2.85 
3  -3.81  -2.42  -1.08 0.23 1.50 2.74 
4  -3.76  -2.40  -1.08 0.20 1.43 2.62 
5  -3.72  -2.38  -1.08 0.16 1.36 2.51 
6  -3.68  -2.35  -1.08 0.13 1.29 2.41 
7  -3.65  -2.34  -1.09 0.10 1.23 2.30 
8  -3.61  -2.32  -1.10 0.06 1.16 2.20 
9  -3.58  -2.30  -1.10 0.03 1.10 2.10 
St.  State -3.88 -3.02 -2.47 -1.92 -1.39 -0.87 
    
 
  D:  COST OF DOMESTIC DEBT AT 12% 
 GROWTH 
Year  2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 
 
1  -2.07  -0.66 0.72 2.08 3.41 4.73 
2  -2.08  -0.69 0.67 2.00 3.30 4.57 
3  -2.08  -0.71 0.63 1.93 3.19 4.42 
4  -2.09  -0.73 0.58 1.85 3.08 4.27 
5  -2.10  -0.75 0.54 1.78 2.98 4.13 
6  -2.11  -0.78 0.50 1.71 2.88 3.99 
7  -2.12  -0.80 0.45 1.65 2.78 3.86 
8  -2.12  -0.82 0.41 1.58 2.69 3.73 
9  -2.13  -0.84 0.37 1.52 2.59 3.61 
10  -2.18  -0.93 0.32 1.48 2.47 3.34 
Steady 
State -2.87 -2.24 -1.63 -1.03 -0.43 0.15 
 
 
*  For details on the computations, see the discussion in the text.  29

































































































Source: IMF Staff estimates 
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